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Abstract 
 
 
This paper investigates the magnitude and the main determinants of share price reactions to 
buy-back announcements of German corporations. For our comprehensive sample of 224 an-
nouncements that took place between May 1998 and April 2003 we find average cumulative 
abnormal returns around -7.5% for the thirty days preceding the announcement and around 
+7.0 % for the ten days following the announcement. We regress post-announcement abnor-
mal returns with multiple firm characteristics and provide evidence which supports the under-
valuation signaling hypothesis but not the excess cash hypothesis or the tax-efficiency hy-
pothesis. In extending prior empirical work, we also analyze price effects from initial state-
ments of firms that they intend to seek shareholder approval for a buy-back plan. Observed 
cumulative abnormal returns on this initial date are in excess of 5% implying a total average 
price effect between 12% and 15% from implementing a buy-back plan. We conjecture that 
the German regulatory environment is the main reason why market variations to buy-back an-
nouncements are much stronger in Germany than in other countries and conclude that initial 
statements by managers to seek shareholders’ approval for a buy-back plan should also be 
subject to legal ad-hoc disclosure requirements. 
 
 
EFM classification: 330, 3501
1. Introduction  
In May 1998 the “Corporation Control and Transparency Act” (KonTraG) abolished major 
restrictions for German corporations to repurchase their own shares. In the five years until 
April 2003, more than 180 German firms used the new freedom through some 240 share 
repurchase announcements. 
This paper presents an event study that investigates the magnitude of share price 
effects from German buy-back announcements and a regression analysis that explores the 
determinants of these share price effects. We strive to reveal the motives of managers of 
German corporations to engage in buy-back transactions. Moreover, given that the German 
laws governing share buy-back plans differ in some important respects from the 
corresponding laws in other countries, we examine whether - and if so - why German 
equity markets react differently to buy-back announcements. 
Motives of managers to buy back shares have been extensively discussed in the 
existing literature (see e.g. COMMENT/JARRELL 1991 and STEPHENS/WEISBACH 1998) so 
that we content ourselves with a brief overview. They can be grouped into two broad 
categories depending on whether they imply actions that are generally expected to be 
commensurate with the interests of (the majority of) shareholders or not. If positive or only 
insignificant abnormal share price reactions to share buy-backs are observed, motives from 
the first category should be more prevalent and vice versa. 
Motives in line with shareholders’ interest include attempts by management to 
convey their assessment to the markets that their corporation is undervalued. Assuming 
semi-strong capital market efficiency, managers - and in particular those of smaller 
corporations - can be assumed to have superior information on the prospects of their firm as 
compared to outside market participants. If they are convinced that the market 
capitalization of their company is considerably below the fundamental value attributed to 
the company based on their projections, buy-backs offer an instrument to bet on these 
projections and thereby to signal the manager’s private information to the market. 
Moreover, low value firms should find it prohibitively costly to mimic the behavior of 
undervalued firms. Otherwise, AKERLOF’S (1970) lemons model would rule out positive 
price responses. If credible, however, the signal should lead to an appreciation of the share 
price and thereby benefit existing shareholders. Also in line with shareholders’ interest are 
those share buy-back transactions that are financed with excess cash and that take place in 
jurisdictions where any capital gains induced by buy-backs impose a smaller tax burden on 
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dominant shareholder groups than dividend payouts. Excess of free cash flow gives rise to 
agency conflicts because managers might otherwise use the cash for negative net present 
value investments like fringe benefit consumption or empire building and thereby harm the 
owners of the firm (Jensen 1986). Although share repurchase announcements might 
indicate a poor set of investment opportunities, they offer management an alternative 
instrument to dividends to return excess cash to shareholders and thereby to reduce 
principal-agent conflicts. Investors’ prior beliefs regarding the probability that managers 
will actually pay out excess cash should be a positive function of the alignment of manager 
interests with investor interests. Alignment is typically attained through incentive-based 
manager compensation contracts or through the concentration of control rights in the hands 
of larger blockholders, who have stronger incentives to monitor and discipline management 
than dispersed owners (SHLEIFER/VISHNY 1986). As a consequence, repurchase 
announcements by firms with aligned interests should not come at a large surprise to 
investors. A similar argument applies to situations in which investors judge that 
repurchases are a more tax-efficient means than dividends to pay out an anticipated amount 
of cash to shareholders. The repurchase announcement then only reveals the actual choice 
by management and again does not convey much new information. 
A further reason to buy back shares arises in the context of stock- or option-based 
compensation plans established by the firm in question. It can be safely assumed that the 
transaction cost related to a seasoned equity offer exceed that of a buy-back plan, so that 
buy-backs are typically a more cost-efficient way to obtain the shares to be distributed 
among employees. Such a buy-back transaction should by itself not lead to strong equity 
market reactions and hence, should not destroy shareholder value because the ramifications 
of the compensation plan can be assumed to be known ex ante. Finally, buy-back 
announcements might convey management’s goal to obtain a tax-efficient currency to 
finance future growth through mergers and acquisitions. Typically, an exchange of shares is 
more tax-efficient for the target firm than the receipt of cash. This might ceteris paribus – 
i.e. irrespective of the value potential of the transaction itself – lead to a lower price and 
hence should be considered to be commensurate with the interests of shareholders.  
The second, much smaller, category of buy-back motives includes management’s 
efforts to repel takeover attempts that would actually increase the value of the combined 
entity but reduce private benefits for managers. By reducing cash reserves and at the same 
time reducing the amount of shares that can be purchased by raiders, managers seek to 
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prevent changes in corporate control and thereby to entrench in their positions. Managers 
who undertake buy-backs in defensive situations might hence act solely in their own 
interest and possibly at the expense of shareholders. Another situation in which the interests 
of at least one group of shareholders are violated arises when shares are repurchased at a 
premium from a specified group of shareholders, or more generally, when corporate 
insiders use repurchases to engage in informed trading at the expense of outside 
shareholders (IKENBERRY/VERMAELEN 1996). Finally, managers who hold a substantial 
equity stake in their firm might launch a repurchase program in an attempt to dilute the 
control of other shareholder groups. Even if these other shareholders are not willing to 
tender their shares a negative value impact might arise from the nontrivial transaction cost 
associated with the attempt. 
In our study on 224 buy-back announcements we find average cumulative abnormal 
returns of 7.0% for an event window that starts on the day prior to announcement and 
extends for twelve days, indicating that motives from the first category prevail in Germany. 
A regression analysis based on a comprehensive dataset with detailed company information 
furthermore reveals that abnormal returns are negatively correlated with a firm’s size, its 
market-to-book ratio and the past performance of its shares. We interpret this as strong 
evidence in favor of the undervaluation signaling hypothesis. We also find that abnormal 
returns are a negative function of a variable that attempts to capture investors’ perception 
whether a given firm is a potential takeover target or not. This result indicates that buy-
backs as a takeover defense destroy shareholder value. In a separate event study we 
investigate abnormal returns around the date at which the corporation launches a public 
statement that it plans to buy back own shares at some point in the future and that it 
therefore intends to obtain the legally required shareholder authorization for a buy-back 
plan during the next annual general meeting. Cumulative abnormal returns around this 
initial statement, which typically precedes the actual buy-back announcement by several 
months, amount to CAR [-5;-5] = 5.2% on average. In comparing our results to the existing 
literature we find that total abnormal returns from planning and announcing share buy-
backs are considerably higher in Germany than in most other countries. We conjecture that 
the strict German legal ramifications are responsible for this observation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section gives a brief 
overview on the legal framework governing buy-backs in Germany. Section 3 reviews the 
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extant literature and section 4 describes the data we use and the methodology we apply. 
Section 5 presents and discusses our empirical results. The last section concludes. 
 
 
2. Share Buy-Backs in Germany   
We treat ‘share buy-backs’ or ‘equity repurchases’ as synonymous notions for a transaction 
through which a corporation repurchases some portion of its outstanding shares in the open 
market or through a tender offer. Since the Corporation Control and Transparency Act 
(KonTraG) became effective on May 1, 1998, German corporation have been permitted to 
buy back common and preferred shares under the following conditions and subject to the 
following requirements, respectively. The volume of shares to be repurchased must 
generally not exceed 10% of nominal share capital
1 and only funds that could have 
otherwise been paid out to shareholders in the form of dividends can be disbursed for 
repurchase transactions. All shareholders of the corporation must be treated the same. The 
firm must not repurchase its shares for the purpose of trading. Repurchases (but not any 
subsequent sale of repurchases shares) have to be authorized by the annual general meeting 
of shareholders (AGM). The AGM has to decide on the maximum amount of shares to be 
repurchased, on the time horizon over which transactions can take place (maximum of 18 
months), and on the method of repurchasing, if the corporation does not intend to 
repurchase through the open market.
2 When management decides to actually repurchase 
shares it is required to announce the decision to the public. There is no requirement at this 
point in time, however, to state the motivation for the decision or to report the planned 
volume of shares to be repurchased. Moreover, German regulators do not deem the 
announcements that a repurchase plan will be proposed to the AGM, nor the approval of 
such a plan by the AGM as a fact relevant for the valuation of securities and hence both 
                                                 
1 Share buy-backs in accordance to section 71 (1) Nr. 6 of the Aktiengesetz (German Stock Corporation Act – 
AktG) that serve the sole purpose of reducing a corporation’s nominal capital are an exception to this rule. A 
five-percent threshold applies to financial institutions trading in their own purposes (section 71 (1) Nr. 7 
AktG). The law does not specify whether the thresholds apply to the total stock of repurchased shares held in 
treasury or solely to one 18-month period. In the latter case, firms could in principle buy back a substantially 
higher portion of own shares by obtaining AGM approval in subsequent years. For a discussion of this 
ambiguity see Kraft/Altvater (1998) and Bosse (2000).  
   
2 Existing types of non-open-market buy-backs include: Fixed-price tender offers, where the corporation 
offers to buy a specified amount of shares at a fixed price - typically exceeding current market prices - during 
a fixed tender offer period; Dutch-auction tender-offers, which are similar to fixed-price tender offers, except 
that prices are set in a book-building procedure; targeted buy-backs, where the corporation negotiates with a 
particular shareholder over the purchase of a block of shares. For a detailed overview on existing types of 
buy-back transactions see e.g. Lamba/Ramsay (2000). 5
incidents are not subject to ad-hoc disclosure requirements that were introduced by the 2
nd 
Financial Market Promotion Act from 1994.
3 Figure 1 shows the average number of weeks 
that elapsed between the three events for the firms in our sample. During the AGM that 
follows any share buy-back transaction, management has to inform shareholders on the 
motives that underlay the transaction, its volume and the price paid per share. Finally, 
under German law, repurchased shares held in treasury are not entitled to voting rights and 
dividend payouts. As a consequence, dividends per outstanding share will ceteris paribus be 
larger after a share buy-back transaction. 
German legal ramifications for share buy-backs differ along some important lines 
from US regulations. In the US, share repurchase programs do not require approval by the 
annual shareholders’ meeting but only by the board of directors. Repurchasing transactions 
need not be publicly announced and the periodical transaction volume is neither capped by 
a 10% threshold nor by the amount of funds available for dividend distribution. 
Furthermore, transactions do not have to take place during a specified 18-month time 
window. STEPHENS/WEISBACH (1998) report that it is not uncommon that open market 
programs spread out over several years. Taken together, German firms have less leeway in 
tailoring a repurchase program to their objectives, thereby ruling out, or at least strongly 
mitigating, the motives that we discussed in the introduction as not being commensurate 
with shareholders’ interests. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Firstly, the requirement of equal treatment of all shareholders in combination with 
the obligation to obtain AGM authorization for repurchasing shares through tender offers or 
targeted buy-backs strongly impedes wealth transfers from one shareholder group to 
another. As a matter of fact, a mere four out of the total of 237 buy-back transactions in our 
sample were not conducted over the open market.
4 Secondly, because the amount of equity 
to be repurchased is capped at 10% of total capital, the effectiveness of buy-backs as a 
                                                 
3 However, section 71 (1) Nr. 8 requires management to immediately report the authorization by the AGM to 
Germany’s financial services authority (BaFin). 
   
4 Those are AGIV (4-Apr-00, fixed-price tender offer to common shareholders), Friedrich Grohe (7-Oct-99, 
fixed-price tender offer to minority holders of preferred stock), Kögel Fahrzeuge (7-Dec-98, fixed-price 
tender offer to common shareholders) and Krones AG (18-Jan-99, Dutch auction tender-offer). 6
takeover defense device is limited. We hence expect to observe negative abnormal share 
price effects from announcements of share repurchases only in a few cases.
5  
The flipside of the stricter legal ramifications is that managers might feel 
constrained in signaling private information or in disbursing excess cash to shareholders. 
According to COMMENT/JARRELL (1991), in more than a fifth of all US open market 
repurchases between 1984 and 1989, firms sought to buy back more than 10% of 
outstanding shares. The authors also show that this group of firms experienced substantially 
greater average excess returns after buy-back announcements than firms with low-fraction 
repurchases. Because announcements regarding the repurchase volume are neither 
mandatory nor binding in Germany, it does not come at a surprise that the vast majority of 
German firms in our sample announced that it planned to buy back shares up to the 
maximum amount approved by the AGM. This apparent pooling equilibrium renders any 
non-binding provision of information regarding repurchase volume useless for investors 
and therefore depletes German managers of an extra choice variable.
6 Therefore, only the 
announcement itself can be used for signaling. We argue that German legal requirements 
and the threat of a reputation loss impose significant ex post signaling cost to firms that do 
not intend to repurchase after an announcement, thus allowing for a separating equilibrium 
in repeated games. Non-repurchasing firms and firms that buy back only a trivial amount of 
their shares must reckon that regulators suspect price manipulation and initiate 
investigations. Shareholders of these firms will most likely also make inquiries, possibly 
calling into question the managers’ reputation for truthful disclosures. Repurchasing and 
immediately reselling shares is neither a viable option for this type of firms because such 
behavior would certainly be viewed as trading in own shares, which is explicitly ruled out 
by law. As a consequence, the repurchase announcement allows firms to convey 
information that might induce investors to update their beliefs about the firm’s future 
prospects and about the mitigation of principal agent conflicts regarding the use of free cash 
flow, respectively. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Further explanations for negative price effects are that the announcement induces investors to reassess the 
firm’s set of profitable investment opportunities or any value-diluting characteristics of stock-based 
compensation plans. Another explanation is of course that unobserved events that coincided with the buy-
back announcement confound the measurement of share price effects from share buy-backs. 
   
6 GERKE ET AL. (2002) report that their 156 German sample firms on average only bought back 3.2% of 
outstanding shares. Rational investors will hence use this prior belief when assessing signal strength. 7
3. Related Empirical Literature   
The empirical literature on stock buy-backs has so far largely focused on US markets. A 
number of clear-cut results have emerged. Share repurchases lead to significant positive 
abnormal returns on average, but stock price reactions to tender offers are at least twice as 
large than stock price reactions to open market transactions. MASULIS (1980), DANN 
(1981), VERMAELEN (1981) and COMMENT/JARRELL (1991) found abnormal returns from 
fixed price tender offers well in excess of 10% and an average premium over market price 
of more than 20%. According to Comment/Jarrell (1991) Dutch auction tender offers lead 
on average to an abnormal return of 8% during the three days following the announcement. 
In contrast, open market transaction by US corporations were found by virtually all studies 
to result in much smaller abnormal returns of around 3% (see Table 2). 
The studies cited so far provide strong evidence for the validity of the signaling 
hypothesis. IKENBERRY ET AL (1995) observe a strong negative correlation between the 
market-to-book ratio before the buy-back announcement and the extent of positive 
abnormal returns thereafter. Abnormal returns were also found to be larger for firms whose 
stocks underperformed the market during the days before announcement 
(STEPHENS/WEISBACH 1998, COMMENT/JARRELL 1991 and IKENBERRY ET AL 1995). Both 
results reconcile neatly with the view that the signaling effects are stronger the higher the 
potential for an actual undervaluation. VERMAELEN (1981) shows evidence that the strength 
of the signal is also a function of its credibility. He discovers that abnormal returns increase 
in the amount of shares held by management as well as in the repurchased portion of 
outstanding equity (see also COMMENT/JARRELL 1991 and IKENBERRY ET AL. 1995). The 
more manager wealth is at risk, the more credible is a signal that the firm’s stock is indeed 
a bargain. Finally, the extent of information asymmetries between management and 
investors also seems to have a bearing on signal strength. IKENBERRY ET AL. (1995) 
document that abnormal returns from buy-back announcements decrease in firm size. 
Arguably, smaller firms disclose less information to capital markets and are less researched 
by institutional investors, rating agencies and equity analysts. Taken together, buy-backs 
seem to serve as a credible signaling device for managers who seek to convey to investors 
that the market capitalization of their firm is lower than its true value.
7  
                                                 
   
7 Further studies that underscore this insight include NETTER/MITCHELL (1989) and BARTOV (1991). 
WANSLEY ET AL (1989) directly assess buy-back motives by means of questionnaires and found that perceived 
undervaluation was indeed one of the most frequently quoted motives. 8
The results for other countries are broadly in line with those for the U.S. 
Cumulative returns around the announcement day are on average strictly positive (see 
Table 2) and most studies document evidence corroborating the signaling hypothesis. 
Insert Table 1 here 
A few studies measured market reactions to announcements of share buy-backs that 
could be considered to be used by management as a device to fend off a hostile takeover. 
DANN/DEANGELO (1988), DAVIDSON/GARRISON (1989) and DENIS (1990) observe negative 
abnormal stock price returns and thereby corroborate the hypothesis that this type of buy-
back transaction violates shareholders’ interests. 
SHOVEN/SIMON (1987), BAGWELL/SHOVEN (1988), EVANS ET AL (2000) and 
LI/MCNALLY (1999) have explicitly tested the validity of the free cash flow hypothesis. 
They find a positive correlation between abnormal returns and measures for excess funds at 
the discretion of management. They conclude that buy-backs are an effective means of 
convincing the market that shirking and investments into poor projects is curbed. In 
addition, STEPHENS/WEISBACH (1998) observe that firms with more excess cash ceteris 
paribus tend to buy back larger volumes of shares, indicating that repurchases serve to 
reduce excess cash. 
To our knowledge only two empirical studies exist on buy-backs in Germany. 
SCHREMPER (2000) analyses 120 buy-back announcements between May 1998 and 
December 2000 and finds significant abnormal returns of around 4%. The sample of GERKE 
ET AL. (2002) comprises 156 buy-back announcements for which the authors find average 
abnormal returns on the announcement day of 6.1%.  They subdivide their sample to 
measure differences in abnormal returns between a) firms that either belong to the DAX 
100 index (+2.7%), the Nemax index (+9.0%) or the small cap index (+4.8%), b) firms that 
either stated undervaluation (+8.9%) or the exchange of cash into a superior acquisition 
currency (+5.2%) as their main repurchasing motive, and c) firms that bought back shares 
during the general upturn of German equity markets between May 1998 and February 2000 
(+3.7%) and firms that bought back shares during the subsequent bear market (+7.1%). We 
extend the work of both SCHREMPER (2002) and GERKE ET AL. (2002) by using a larger 
sample size, by investigating price effects around the initial disclosure of the intention to 
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buy back shares and by conducting multivariate regression analyses on a richer set of 
independent variables.
8  
 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
We conduct a standard market-model event study to measure price effects from buy-back 
announcements. Price effects correspond to abnormal returns, or equivalently, excess 
returns on a firm’s stock on the announcement day [0] or over a short time window around 
that date (e.g. days [-1;+1]), respectively. Abnormal daily returns (ARit) are defined as the 
difference between the observed share price return (Rit) on that day and an estimated 
“normal” daily return (Rit*), which is derived from a market model. We use daily share 
price returns during the time window [-270;-60] and the ordinary least square (OLS) model 
in (1) to estimate the parameters for the market model.  
 
(1) R it = αi + βi Rmt + εit   for t = -270, -269, … , -60    with   E(εit)=0  and 
var(εit)=σ
2(εit) 
 
The estimators and the daily market return are entered into (2) to obtain the estimated 
return Rit* for share i. 
 
(2) Rit*= ai + bi Rmt 
 
The t-statistics from equations (2) and (3) are used to test the Null-hypothesis that abnormal 
returns on a particular day and cumulative abnormal returns for a given period [t; t+n], 
respectively, are not different from zero: 
 
(3)  t = ARi/σ(ARi)   with σ(ARi) equal to the standard error of the estimate from 
 (1) 
 
(4)   t = CARi
i+n/σ(CARi
i+n) with σ(CARi
i+n)=√n • σ(ARi) 
 
                                                 
   
8 Our regression analysis shows that the price effect from being listed on a particular market might indeed be 
spurious and rather be driven by firm size. 10
Daily stock returns are computed as the difference between the logarithms of stock prices at 
market close of day t and day t-1. Stock prices were sourced from Datastream. For Rmt we 
used the broadly defined Composite DAX (CDAX) index.   
We conducted a variety of key-word searches on the SDC M&A database of 
Thomson Financial, the news databases of Reuters, Bloomberg and Factiva as well as the 
Ad-hoc Announcements Database of the Deutsche Börse AG in order to identify buy-back 
announcements by German firms, which - by definition - had already obtained AGM 
approval. For the period from May 1, 1998 to April 11, 2003 we found 181 companies with 
a total of 237 such individual share buy-back announcements. Figure 2 shows the number 
of announcements per month. The observation that announcements occur in waves points to 
a conscious timing of the share buy-backs by the firms. We can think of two explanations 
for this phenomenon. Firstly, managers might attempt to improve the share price 
performance towards the end of the company’s financial year in order to produce better 
valuation ratios. Secondly, given that firms do not wait until the end of the predetermined 
18-month period and given that AGMs typically take place in April or May one should 
expect the bulk of buy-back announcements to occur in the second half of the year. We also 
searched the database of Germany’s financial regulator BaFin (www.bafin.de) for reported 
AGM approvals of buy-back plans. From May 1998 until April 11, 2003, 483 corporations 
sought an AGM approval for a total of 785 buy-back plans. Taking into account that buy-
back announcements occur on average 21 weeks after an AGM, we arrive at a relevant 
universe of 761 AGM approvals for our sample of 237 announcements. The ex ante 
average probability that a firm exercises its AGM permission is therefore roughly one third. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
For the empirical analyses of announcement effects we excluded four observations 
because shares were not repurchased over the open market but through tender offers and 
another nine because coincident confounding news such as board changes or windfall 
profits was released on the announcement date.
9 This left us with a total sample of 224 
observations for which we measure price effects of share buy-back announcements. The 
same sample is used to investigate the determinants of these price effects by means of OLS-
                                                 
   
9 Only those confounding events have been considered relevant which stood in no obvious connection with 
the share buy-back itself. We assume that price effects from any coinciding news that are directly related to 
the share buy-back such as financial forecasts cancel out on average across the total sample. 11
regressing abnormal returns with the following variables. Table 3 below shows the 
corresponding descriptive statistics. 
•  MTB: The Market-to-Book ratio is defined as the market value of equity two days 
before the announcement date divided by the book value of equity as reported in the 
most recent financial statements prior to announcement.
10 Low market-to-book equity 
ratios indicate an assessment of investors that the firm in question possesses poor 
investment opportunities (BAGWELL/SHOVEN 1988). We argue that a low ratio tends to 
increase the perceived potential for an undervaluation of a firm’s stock. Signaling by 
means of announcing a share repurchase transaction might then trigger a reassessment 
of investment opportunities. Lower market-to-book ratios might then be associated with 
stronger price effects. The prevalence of long-term mean reversion in stock returns, 
which was recently documented by MOERSCHEN/SCHIERECK (2003) for the German 
equity market, might reinforce this relationship. A further explanation for any observed 
negative correlation between MTB and price effects is associated with agency conflicts 
between management and owners. Poor investment opportunities might imply more 
financial slack, so that the decision by managers to pay out excess cash is especially 
welcomed by investors in these situations. 
•  SIZE: Firm size is expressed by the logarithm of its enterprise value. Enterprise value is 
defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of interest bearing 
debt.
11 Size is treated as a proxy for the extent of information asymmetries between a 
firm and the capital markets. The larger a firm, we argue, the more information is 
publicly available due to more stringent disclosure requirements and stronger analyst 
coverage. Ceteris paribus, buy-back announcements that serve the purpose of signaling 
an undervaluation should convey more information to investors in the case of smaller 
firms. 
•  NMLISTING: This dummy variable is set to 1 if the firm was traded on the Neuer 
Markt - a by now abolished segment of the German stock exchange for young and 
innovative firms.  Like SIZE, NMLISTING also serves as a proxy for information 
asymmetries between the company and its investors. Firms listed on the Neuer Markt 
                                                 
10 Table 5 below shows that MTB is uncorrelated with the cumulative stock price returns over a 30-day 
interval before the announcement date. We therefore assume (and we will verify this assumption in the next 
version of this paper) that using the market value on day -2 before the announcement date as the nominator of 
MTB does not distort our regression results. 
   
11 We refrained from subtracting the cash position from debt value to avoid negative enterprise values for 
some firms.  12
are typically characterized by shorter track records and a higher degree of uncertainty 
regarding future industry prospects than more mature firms listed on other exchange 
segments. As a consequence, signals should be stronger for Neuer Markt firms. 
•  PASTRETURN: This variable measures the cumulated returns of a firm’s stock over 
the 30 day-period prior to our event window [-31;-2]. The worse the performance, the 
larger is arguably the potential for undervaluation and the more might therefore the 
market treat buy-back announcements as credible undervaluation signals. We use 
returns instead of abnormal returns, because we expect both, management’s assessment 
of undervaluation and management’s timing of an undervaluation signal to depend on 
the past absolute return on the stock rather than on its return relative to the market 
return.
12 
•  UNDERVAL: This dummy variable is set to 1 if a firm states “undervaluation” as a 
main motive for repurchasing own shares. Although German firms are not legally 
obliged to disclose their motives for share buy-backs, it is common practice that they 
provide such information in the press release which contains the repurchase 
announcement itself. Out of the 224 firms in our final sample, 185 disclosed their 
motives.
13 In many cases, more than one motive was stated. Table 2 below reports the 
total number of declarations and the percentage of firms per type of motive. 96 or 
roughly one half of the firms stated a perceived undervaluation of their stock as one 
reason to buy back shares.
14 Because the cost for the firm associated with this statement 
is virtually zero, the statement should actually not be a credible signal to the market. 
Hence we would expect to observe no difference in announcement effects between 
firms stating different motives. 
Insert Table 3 here 
•  CASH: This variable is defined as the amount of liquid assets over the book value of 
equity. It is used as an – albeit weak – measure for the amount of free cash that is at 
management’s disposal. If free cash flow is large, investors might welcome share buy-
backs as a means of avoiding management consumption of private benefits. 
•  CONTROL25, CONTROL50 and CONTROL75: These dummy variables are set to 1 if 
the portion of combined holdings of the two largest shareholders in a firm’s total 
                                                 
12 Using cumulative abnormal returns instead leaves our empirical results virtually unchanged. 
13 UNDERVAL was set to zero for the 39 firms that did not specify their motives. 
   
14 In the Canadian sample of LI/MCNALLY (1999), more than two thirds of the 183 firms stated 
undervaluation as their main motivation. 13
outstanding shares lies in a specific range. Control25 is 1 for holdings greater or equal 
to 25% and below 50% of total shares outstanding. CONTROL50 is 1 if holdings are 
greater or equal 50% and smaller than 75%. CONTROL75 is 1 if holdings are 75% or 
greater.  We thereby attempt to measure any price effects that might arise from a firm’s 
specific governance structure.  If a firm is controlled by only a few large blockholders, 
minority shareholder have to fear that large blockholders exercise their power in their 
own interest, e.g. by inducing the firm’s management (which might actually be identical 
with or at least closely related to blockholders in the case of manager- and family-
controlled firms) to transact with them at favorable terms or to invest in projects that 
one-sidedly benefits them.
15 If the extraction of private benefits by large shareholders is 
indeed prevalent, one should expect larger abnormal returns for firms with concentrated 
ownership. In these cases, buy-backs imply an unexpected payout of cash that might 
have already been written off by minority shareholders. 
•  TARGET: We introduce this dummy variable to test whether investors’ perceptions that 
a buy-back transaction might primarily be used to fend off a takeover lead to lower 
abnormal returns. Since we cannot observe investors’ perceptions directly, we searched 
for constellations where share repurchases bore the potential of reducing the free-float 
down to a level that would have made it difficult for raiders to accumulate a controlling 
stake over the open market and where managers and family owners, respectively, had a 
substantial but non-controlling equity stake in the firm. In these constellations, 
management and owner families may fear that outside raiders take over control of the 
firm and subsequently curb any existing opportunities for incumbents to extract private 
benefits from the firm. We set TARGET to 1 if the free float was smaller than 25% and 
if the combined stake of managers and family owners was between 25% and 50% 
shortly before the announcement date.
16 
•  FINANCIAL and SERVICE: We introduced two industry dummies to control for 
industry effects. FINANCIAL is 1 if a firm belongs to the financial services sector and 
                                                 
15 EHRHARDT/NOWAK (2002) show in their empirical analysis that private benefits for family blockholders 
can indeed be very large in German firms and that stocks of firms, where founding families own more than 
75% underperformed their peers significantly over a three-year period. NENOVA (2003) finds that the value of 
corporate voting rights, which can be interpreted as a lower bound for actual private benefits of the 
controlling shareholders was more than twice as high in Germany than in the US in 1997. 
   
16 Because managers affiliated with the owner family might carry a different surname, we were not able to 
distinguish between managing families and pure owner families. Another weakness of the TARGET dummy 
is that the filtering rule implicitly assumes that a raider can only buy shares from minority shareholders but 
not from other non-family and non-manager blockholders. However, because TARGET is equal to 1 only for 
8% of the observations, the subset of falsely categorized observations is arguably quite small. 14
SERVICE is 1 if a firm belongs to all other service industries, respectively. For firms 
from the manufacturing industry both dummies are set to zero. 
Insert Table 3 here 
We did not collect data on the volume of shares actually repurchased after the 
announcement. That is because this information was not available to investors at the 
announcement date and therefore should not have an impact on share price. Another 
variable, for which we tried to collect data is the fraction of shares that was in the hands of 
the firm’s managers and their families. Unfortunately, however, it was not possible in the 
majority of cases to identify whether managers were indeed associated with any owner 
family.
17 
 
 
5. Empirical Results  
Abnormal Returns on the Announcement Date 
Figure 3 below plots average abnormal stock returns for the 224 observations in our 
sample.  Day zero marks the respective event date at which firms announced to repurchase 
shares over the open market. The average abnormal return on this day is 4.9%, with 78% of 
the sample firms showing positive abnormal returns. Average cumulative abnormal returns 
around the announcement date are even larger: roughly 6% for the time window [-1;+1] 
and almost 7% for the time windows [-1;+5] and [-1;+10].
18 All return figures are 
significantly different from zero at the 1%-level, implying that announcements incorporate 
information effects. Moreover, Figure 5 indicates that share prices of sample firms 
experienced a conspicuous abnormal downward trend over the 30 trading days before the 
event date. COMMENT/JARRELL (1991) document a very similar pattern in their analysis of 
some 1,200 US open market repurchase programs. Announcements are preceded by 
negative net-of-market stock performance and positive excess price effects reverse about 
half of this underperformance.  
Insert Figure 3 here 
                                                 
17 The simple approach to map the names of managers with the names of shareholders surely substantially 
underestimates the true extent to which managers (and their families) have a stake in the firm. Therefore it did 
not come at a surprise to us that such a narrowly defined variable of manager ownership did not carry a 
significant coefficient in any regression model of this paper. We hence dropped the variable altogether. 
   
18 The percentage of sample firms with positive cumulative abnormal decrease with the length of the event 
window: 73% for [-1;1], 72% for [-1;5] and 66% for [-1,10]. 15
Regression Results 
Table 4 presents the results of six OLS regressions using the White correction for 
heteroskedasticity. The full model includes all twelve independent variables. For the 
reduced model we have dropped three variables that are strongly correlated (correlation 
coefficients exceeding 0.25 – see Table 6 below) to one or more of the other variables. 
Price effects from buy-back announcements are on average greater for firms with 
lower market-to-book ratios (MTB), for smaller firms (SIZE), for firms listed on the Neuer 
Markt (NMLISTING), for firms that experienced lower share price returns prior to 
announcement (PASTRETURN) and for firms that stated undervaluation as a motivation 
for the share repurchase (UNDERVAL). For the other variables results are more 
ambiguous. The coefficients of both CONTROL25 and CONTROL50 are negative but not 
significant. The coefficient of CONTROL75 always carries a positive sign but is only 
weakly significant for the reduced model and CAR[-1;1]. Price effects from buy-backs that 
are potentially perceived as a takeover defense device are virtually zero on the 
announcement day but strongly negative (and slightly significant) when measured over a 
two- or eleven-day observation period (TARGET). Finally, the amount of cash on a firm’s 
books does not seem to affect share price reactions at all (CASH). 
We interpret these results as strong evidence for the validity of the signaling 
hypothesis. Investors seem to be more willing to update their beliefs regarding a firm’s 
future prospects if the potential for an undervaluation of the firm’s equity is greater and if 
the signal is more credible. Above, we argued that this tends to be case if past share price 
returns and market-to-book ratios are low and if information asymmetries between 
managers and investors are large, which themselves can be assumed to be a negative 
function of firm size. The fact that past absolute (and also past abnormal) share price 
returns explain announcement effects indicates a deliberate timing of the announcement by 
management
19, supporting the view that firms use buy-backs to signal undervaluation. 
Surprisingly, statements by managers that they view their firm as undervalued also 
seem to have measurable effects on abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns 
between day -1 and day +10 are on average more than five percentage points higher for 
firms that made such a statement. Because the statement itself is virtually costless and 
                                                 
   
19 Given a deliberate timing, one should not observe too many instances where the steep decline in stock price 
that potentially triggered the buy-back announcement had been pre-empted by one or more intervals with 
similarly negative returns. We are currently analyzing the entire history of (abnormal) returns following the 
AGM approval and will report the results of this analysis in the next version of this paper. 16
therefore can be assumed to lack credibility, we are inclined to treat this result very 
cautiously. We rather suspect that unobserved firm characteristics that are correlated to the 
variable UNDERVAL are responsible for this result. 
Insert Table 4 here 
The negative coefficients of the TARGET variable provides some, albeit very weak 
evidence for a negative relationship between abnormal returns and the perception by 
investors that a buy-back transaction aims at fending off a (potential) hostile takeover. The 
fact that coefficients for TARGET are only negative for wider event windows and only 
very weakly significant for [-1;10] points at a large degree of initial uncertainty regarding 
the true motives of management that can only be resolved after (time-consuming) further 
investigations. 
Insert Table 5 here 
We find no evidence corroborating the free cash-flow hypothesis. In the last section 
we argued that low market-to-book ratios in conjunction with large cash positions might 
indicate financial slack on a firm’s books. Share repurchases reduce financial slack and 
thereby potentially mitigate agency problems between managers and owners, which should 
have a positive impact on share prices. Although MTB carries the expected sign in Table 4, 
we do not observe any clear relationship between abnormal returns and a firm’s cash 
position. In an extended model specification we also analyzed the explanatory power of a 
newly defined variable MTB/CASH. Again, coefficients were statistically insignificant. 
The ownership structure of a firm - as captured by the three CONTROL variables – 
does not seem to have a measurable bearing on abnormal announcement returns. The 
positive and weakly significant coefficients of CONTROL75 might hint at mounting 
expectations by minority shareholders that they will get squeezed out by majority owners in 
the near future. If minority shareholders anticipate receiving a premium over market price 
at that future date, price elasticity can be expected to be even higher. 
We are not able to test directly the validity of the tax-efficiency hypothesis which 
presumes that a firm should distribute excess cash through share repurchases if dividend 
payouts implied a higher tax burden to its shareholders. Prior to 1999 capital gains were 
taxed only slightly lower than income from dividends for tax payers in the highest tax 
bracket (56% versus 61.3%). As a consequence of recent German tax reforms, capital gains 
from share repurchases now lead to a much lower tax burden for this clientele than 
   17
dividend payouts (38,4% versus 59,1% in 2001 and 54,4% in 2002 and 2003).  Over our 
observation period from 1998-2003 investors in higher tax brackets should have therefore 
preferred share repurchases to dividend payouts, especially in the year 2001, when capital 
gains were tax advantaged over dividends by more than 20 percentage points. Since we do 
not observe a sharp increase in share-buy back activity after 1999 we feel safe to conclude 
that tax efficiency is probably not an important motive of German managers to repurchase 
shares.
20 
Abnormal Returns from Statements by Management to Seek AGM Approval for a Buy-
Back Plan 
Given that buy-back announcements lead on average to strong abnormal price reactions, 
any prior event that implies a substantial increase in the probability that such an 
announcement will eventually occur should also affect share price. The intricacies of 
German laws governing buy-back plans give rise to such a prior event, namely the initial 
statement by management that it will seek AGM approval for a buy-back plan. In this 
section, we first estimate the magnitude of abnormal returns at that early stage and then 
compare our estimate to the empirical evidence. 
Price reactions (RA= 1+rA) at the early date A, at which a firm publicly states its 
intention to seek AGM approval, should be a positive function of the expected abnormal 
share price appreciation on the later announcement date B (RB=1+rB) and the probability p 
that investors assign to the actual future occurrence of a buy-back announcement. Taking 
on the perspective of investors who want to identify the maximum share price appreciation 
RA at which it is no longer worthwhile to buy the stock in question, we can write
21 
 
(5) RA = p (RA RB) + (1-p) 1 . 
 
Collecting terms and solving for RA yields 
 
(6) RA = (1-p) / (1-p RB) . 
 
 
                                                 
20 According to the Deutsches Aktieninstitut, the total volume of dividend disbursements by German 
corporations has increased from 74 billion Euro in 1999 to 79 billion Euro in 2000. The lack of a sharp 
increase in buy-backs can therefore not be explained by a decline in total cash disbursements to shareholders. 
   
21 For the sake of simplicity we implicitly assume risk neutral investors and a discount rate of zero. 18
From section 4 we know that only roughly one third of all firms that sought AGM approval 
actually announced a buy-back transaction during the subsequent 18 months. Setting p = 
1/3 and RB = 1.07% (see Figure 5 above) yields an estimate for RA of 1.036. One should 
therefore expect to observe average abnormal returns of roughly rA=3.6% when new 
information about a firm seeking AGM approval arrives on the market. 
To verify this estimate we performed a new search in the news- and ad hoc 
databases mentioned above to find initial statements by firms that they are about to seek 
AGM approval for a buy-back plan. To avoid a selection bias, we did not restrict ourselves 
to the 181 firms that subsequently announced a repurchase transaction. This new search 
strategy yielded over 300 observations. However, we had to drop the majority of 
observations because the sought-after statements were part of a more comprehensive 
disclosure of multiple statements by the firm in question and because it was impossible to 
pinpoint the exact date of the statement, respectively (e.g. because the statement was part of 
the invitation letter to the AGM). The final sample comprises 111 observations that are 
fairly evenly distributed across the observation period. We then re-applied the methodology 
from section 4 to plot average abnormal returns around the date A. Figure 4 below shows 
that the average rA is larger than 5% for most event windows and therefore exceeds our 
estimate of 3.6% considerably. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
We offer three explanations for this discrepancy. Firstly, abnormal returns might be 
distorted by confounding events on dates A and B, respectively, or by a selection bias 
regarding the observations for date A. Secondly, investors might have been overly 
optimistic regarding the true probability that an initial statement to seek AGM approval for 
a buy-back plan will indeed be followed by a later announcement to repurchase shares. On 
the same token, one might also call into question the credibility of such an initial statement, 
because the only cost to be incurred by firms that send a false signal are reputation losses. 
The third explanation assumes that investors behave rationally and that signaling is indeed 
costly. If this holds true we must have so far overlooked additional events C in the interim 
period between dates A and B or after date B that are associated with positive abnormal 
returns on average. The AGM approval and any actual open-market buy-back transactions 
are candidates for these missing events. By solving (5) for the implied RB and dividing RB 
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by the observed abnormal return RB’=1.07 on date B we can estimate the expected average 
abnormal return (RC) for these missing events. 
 
(7)   RC = (RA - 1 + p)] / (p RA RB’) 
 
Entering RA=1.05, p=1/3 and RB’=1.07 into equation (7) yields RC=1.024. Given that the 
third explanation is correct, the total cumulative abnormal return from implementing a 
repurchase plan amounts to RA * RB’ * RC – 1 = 15.0%. Given that the second explanation 
is correct (no omitted event), the implied total return decreases to RA * RB’ = 12.4%. 
Compared to the results of event studies for other countries (see Table 1), this average price 
effect from open-market share repurchases by German firms is remarkably high.  
We can only speculate why this is the case. Information asymmetries between 
managers and (outside) investors might be larger for German firms than for firms from 
market based financial systems such as the US or the UK. LEUZ/WÜSTEMANN (2004) show 
in detail that the role of the German accounting system is not so much to disseminate 
information to the capital markets but rather to support private information channels to 
privileged inside investors like “Hausbanks” and blockholders. Empirical studies indeed 
show that the information content of financial statements is less value relevant and less 
timely than in the US or the UK
22. As a consequence, additional public disclosures by 
German firms might embody relatively more relevant information content than in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. If the extent of information asymmetries were indeed the main 
determinant of country differences in announcement effects, one should in turn expect to 
observe similar differences in abnormal returns from announcements regarding other 
financing decisions of firms. However, GEBHARDT (2001) documents in his overview of 
selected empirical studies that neither announcements of changes in dividend payouts nor 
announcements of seasoned equity offers seem to result in higher market variations for 
German firms than for US firms. 
We therefore conjecture that the strict German legal provisions that govern the 
entire buy-back process from the ex ante obligation to obtain AGM approval to the ex post 
obligation to disclose the details of any transactions on the subsequent AGM provide for a 
higher credibility of buy-back announcements as undervaluation signals than in the US 
context. In the US, investors can only infer from buy-back announcements that firms intend 
                                                 
   
22 See e.g. JOOS/LANG (1994) and HARRIS ET AL. (1994). 20
to repurchase own shares. Investors cannot deduce, however, any obligation by the firm to 
imminently engage in a repurchase transaction. Further research should investigate whether 
other countries with high observed abnormal returns (such as Japan) possess legal 
ramifications that are prone to enhance any undervaluation signal from buy-back 
announcements. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes share price effects from buy-back announcements of German 
corporations. We observe high negative pre-announcement abnormal returns and high 
positive post-announcement returns and therefore confirm the empirical results of prior US 
and international event studies for Germany. Moreover, our regression analysis 
corroborates the undervaluation signaling hypothesis. Firm-specific
23 variables such as 
market-to-book ratio and firm size, which attempt to capture the potential for 
undervaluation and potential information asymmetries between managers and outside 
investors were found to be closely related to the magnitude of price effects. We find no 
evidence in support of the excess cash hypothesis, according to which firms repurchase 
shares with excess cash in order to alleviate agency conflicts. 
The legal requirement that German corporations must first obtain shareholders’ 
authorization before repurchasing shares allows us to also analyze another, preceding event 
in the buy-back context, namely the initial statement by management to seek shareholders’ 
authorization. Also for this second event, we find highly positive abnormal share price 
reactions. The fact that implied total abnormal returns from implementing buy-back plans 
seem to be extraordinarily high when compared to share price effects observed for other 
countries poses a research puzzle. We conjecture that differences in the legal requirements 
for conducting buy-back programs are the main determinant for international differences in 
average price effects.  
Our empirical result regarding strong price effects on the announcement date 
reinforces the legal requirement for German firms to report an imminent buy-back 
                                                 
   
23 In a separate regression not reported in the last section we tested whether the undervaluation signal contains 
any relevant industry-wide information. For that purpose, we constructed a set of weighted share price 
indices. Each index covered the entirety of C-DAX firms from a particular industry but not the one firm that 
announced a buy-back. For the announcement date of a given firm, we then measured abnormal returns for 
the corresponding industry index. The average abnormal returns that we obtained were statistically not 
different from zero, thus largely ruling out industry-wide effects. 21
transaction by means of a public ad-hoc disclosure. Given that the preceding, initial 
statement by managers to seek AGM approval also causes considerable market variations, 
we are inclined to suggest that such a statement should also be subject to legal ad-hoc 
disclosure requirements. Otherwise, opportunities remain for trading by informed insiders 
which was prohibited back in 1994 by the 2
nd Financial Market Promotion Act. Figure 4 
above shows positive abnormal returns in the five days before the concerned voluntary 
statement, thus indicating that insider trading might have indeed occurred in the context of 
repurchase transactions by German firms. 
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 Figure 1:  Time line of share buy-backs in Germany (N=224) 
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Table 1:  Prior empirical results on abnormal returns from announcing open-market 
repurchase programs (OMR) 
Country Study  Abnormal  Returns  Dataset 
U.S.   McNally (1999)  CAR [-1;+1]: 2.3%  451 OMR (1985-1988) 
  Vermaelen (1981)  CAR [-1;+1]: 3.7%  243 OMR (1970-1978) 
  Stephens/Weisbach (1998)  CAR [-1;+2]: 2.7%  591 OMR (1981-1990) 
  Ikenberry et al (1995)  CAR [-2;+2]: 3.5%  1,239 OMR (1980-1990) 
  Comment/Jarrell (1991)  CAR [-1;+1]: 2.3%  1,157 OMR (1985-1988) 
Canada  Li/McNally (1999)  CAR [-2;+2]: 3.6%  183 OMR (1989-1992) 
  Ikenberry et all (2000)  CAR [-15;+15]: 0.9%  1,060 OMR (1989-1997) 
Germany   Schremper (2002)  CAR [-1;+1]: 4.1%  112 (mostly) OMR (1998-2000)  
  Gerke et al (2002)  CAR [-1;+1: 6.1%  156 OMR (1998-2000) 
U.K.     Raghavendra et al (2002)  CAR [-5;+5]: 1.1%  264 OMR (1985-1998) 
  Oswald/Young (2002)  CAR [-1;+1]: 1.4%  266 (mostly) OMR (1995-2000)  
  Lasfer (2000)  CAR [-2;+2]:  1.6%  465 (mostly) OMR (1985-1998) 
France    Ginglinger/L’Her (2002)  CAR [-1;+1]: 0.7%  363 OMR (1998-1999) 
Brazil   Moreira/Procianoy (2001)  CAR [-1;+1]: 0.03%  110 OMR 1997-1998)   
Japan   Zhang (2000)  CAR [-1;+2]: 6.0%  39 OMR (1995-1999)   
Australia   Lamba/Ramsay (2000)  CAR [-1;+1]: 3.3%  103 OMR (1989-1998)   
  Otchere/Ross (2000)  CAR [-1;+1]: 4.3%  132 OMR (1991-1999)   
Korea   Jung (2003)  CAR [0;+5]: 2.8%  382 OMR (1994-1998)  
 
 Figure 2:  Share buy-back announcements in Germany (May/1998 – April/2003)  
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Table 2: Motives  for share buy-backs as declared by management (N=185) 
       
   Number of 
declarations 
Percent of 
185 sample firms 
Acquisition currency    107  58% 
Undervaluation  96 52% 
Employee participation programs  32  17% 
Cancellations/pay-outs to shareholders  27  15% 
Other   5  3% 
       
Sum   267   
             
 Table 3:  Descriptive statistics (N=224)  
        
  Dependent variables    Independent variables  Independent dummy variables 
  AR[0]  CAR 
[-1;1] 
CAR 
[-1;10]   MTB SIZE PAST 
RETURN CASH   Averages   
                              
Max. 40.6%  36.8%  56.5%   14.80 11.55 49.6% 125.3%           
Min. -13.6%  -18.5%  -36.6%  0.18 1.76  -71.8%  1.3%  NMLISTING  0.43  TARGET  0.08 
Avg. 4.9%  6.0%  7.0%   2.55  5.49  -11.1%  39.3%  UNDERVAL  0.43  CONT.25 0.33 
Median 3.1% 4.6%  5.0%   1.71  5.06  -7.6%  32.1%  SERVICE  0.29  CONT.50 0.35 
Stdev. 7.8%  9.4%  14.3%   2.78  2.10  21.2%  30.4%  FINANCIAL  0.13  CONT.75 0.11 
                                  
 
 
Figure 3: Average cumulative abnormal returns from buy-back announcements 
(N=224) 
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                         Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
(19.58) 
(15.90) 
(10.30) 
(8.07)
(-5.59) 
= AR [0] 4.90%
= CAR [-1;+1] 5.97%
= CAR [-1;+5] 6.82%
= CAR [-1;+10] 6.99%
-7.54%  = CAR [-30;-2]
 Table 4: OLS regression with robust standard errors (N=224) 
                
    AR[0]     CAR[-1;1]  CAR[-1;10]   AR[0]   CAR[-1;1]     CAR[-1;10]
                
CONSTANT 11.53%***    11.63%*** 15.02%*** 11.60%*** 12.69%***    13.53%*** 
 (0.000)    (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) 
MTB -0.51%***    -0.45%***  -0.69%** -0.44%*** -0.38%***    -0.63%** 
 (0.000)    (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.001) (0.009)    (0.020) 
SIZE   -0.93%***    -1.00%***  -1.29%*** -1.01%*** -1.13%***    -1.26%*** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000)    (0.001) 
NMLISTING 2.95%***    2.43%*  2.31%         
  (0.006)   (0.058)  (0.266)        
PASTRETURN -3.13%   -7.430%** -13.56%*** -3.94% -7.95%**    -14.09%*** 
  (0.243)   (0.033)  (0.001)  (0.155) (0.026)    (0.001) 
UNDERVAL 0.91%    1.83%  5.12%***  1.35%  2.10%*  5.59%*** 
 (0.369)    (0.125)  (0.007)  (0.172) (0.068)    (0.002) 
CASH 0.09%    1.56%  -0.45%         
  (0.957)   (0.406)  (0.871)        
TARGET 0.21%    -3.25%  -5.81% 0.36%  -3.25%    -5.80% 
 (0.922)    (0.141)  (0.127)  (0.873) (0.131)    (0.113) 
CONTROL25 -2.09%    -1.42%  -2.98%         
  (0.183)   (0.414)  (0.227)        
CONTROL50 -1.41%    -1.26%  -2.00%         
  (0.340)   (0.490)  (0.437)        
CONTROL75 0.23%    3.05%  2.40% 0.91%  3.39%*    3.84% 
  (0.902)   (0.155)  (0.500)  (0.571) (0.065)    (0.230) 
SERVICE -2.78%**    -3.60%**  -4.63%** -2.65%**  -3.44%***    -4.67%** 
  (0.030)   (0.013)  (0.048)  (0.034) (0.018)    (0.042) 
FINANCIAL -2.24%*    -2.98%*  -3.65%* -3.02%**  -3.55%**    -4.28%** 
  (0.079)   (0.054)  (0.080)  (0.018) (0.020)    (0.041) 
                       
                
R² 0.218    0.216  0.216  0.184  0.196    0.177 
F Stat  4.51    3.98  4.53  5.21  5.426    6.998 
Significance F  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000 
                        
Notes: Reported results are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors (p-values in 
parentheses). 
            *** significant at least at the 1%-level, ** significant at least at the 5%-level, * significant at least at 
the 10%-level 
 Table 5: Correlation matrix for independent variables (N=224) 
                   
  
MTB SIZE    NM 
LISTING
PAST 
RETURN
UNDER
VAL  CASH TAR
GET
CONT. 
25 
CONT. 
50 
CONT.
75 
SER
VICE
SIZE   0.19                     
NMLISTING 0.01  -0.34                 
PASTRETURN 0.01 0.11  -0.05                 
UNDERVAL -0.08  -0.12  0.16  -0.06               
CASH 0.01  -0.22  0.25  0.07  -0.04             
TARGET -0.07  -0.17  0.16  -0.05  0.06  0.02         
CONTROL25 -0.02  -0.09 0.13  -0.10  -0.04 -0.04  0.05        
CONTROL50 0.01  -0.23 0.11  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.14 -0.52      
CONTROL75 0.00  -0.05 -0.18  -0.01  -0.07 -0.13  -0.10 -0.27 -0.25    
SERVICE -0.05  -0.23  0.22  0.08  0.00 0.05  0.00 0.15 0.05  -0.06   
FINANCIAL 0.11  0.13  -0.28  -0.02 -0.07  -0.21  -0.11 -0.08  -0.11  0.21  -0.24
                                     
 
Figure 4: Average cumulative abnormal returns from statements to seek AGM 
approval for a buy-back plan (N=111) 
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                     Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
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